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RUSSO- GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO
THE SECOND WORLD WAR*
Richard F. Staar
Harding College
"Russian policy is a riddle wrapped in a mystery-
inside an enigma."
—
Winston Churchill.
"Our policy is simple and clear.
" —
Iosef Stalin.
German troops occupied all of Czechoslovakia on
15 March 1939 and violated the Munich Agreement.
This occurred despite the fact that the new Czech
frontiers (after the annexation of the Sudetenland
by Hitler) had been jointly guaranteed by England,
France, Germany and Italy. When the Reich notified
the USSR of the new occupation, the latter protested
and branded the German aggrandizement as "arbitrary,
violent and aggressive." Furthermore, the Russians
stated that they would not recognize the annexation
of the Czech and Slovak provinces in any form what-
soever.
Despite the Soviet protest, events moved rapidly
forward. Germany forced Lithuania to cede the port
and region of Memel (KLajpeda)' only one week later.
A German-Rumanian agreement was signed on 23 March
which inreality transformed the latter country into
a Nazi agrarian appendage . This same month also wit-
nessed the first open German demands upon Poland.
These happenings should have resulted ina natural
rapprochement between Russia on the one hand and Bri-
tain and France on the other. Only a strong alliance
among these three powers could have stopped Hitler
and maintained the peace. A defensive pact, drawn
"Apaper presented st the thirty-ninth annual meeting
of the Arkansas Academy of Science on April22, 195-5 ••
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up in clear terms and announcing that the Big Three
would use force if necessary against further aggres-
sion, possibly might have prevented Germany from
launching the Second World War.
Instead of this rapprochement, on 17 April 1939
Soviet Ambassador Alexei Merekalov visited the State
Secretary at the German Foreign Office, Baron Ernst
von Weizsaecker, for the first time since presenting
his credentials on 5 June 1938. During the ensuing
conversation, the Russian diplomat stated a signifi-
cant principle. He is reported to have said that
Russian policy has always followed a straight
line. Ideological differences of opinion have
influenced Russian-Italian relations hardly at
all, and neither do they need to disturb /Sov-
iet relations/ vis A vis Germany. Soviet Rus-
sia has not utilized the current disputes be-
tween Germany and the Western Democracies a-
gainst us /i.e. against the Germans/ and does
not wish to do so. There is no reason whyRus-
sia could not maintain normal relations with
us. Even normal relations can be improved. =/
This meeting was followed up on 5 May, when Georgi
Astakhov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin,
was invited to call on Dr. Karl Schnurre, head of the
East European and Baltic Section in the Auswaertiges
Amt Commercial Policy Division. The Russian made it
clear that his country desired a resumption of trade
negotiations. In Schnurre 's words, "Astakhov then
began to speak about the removal of Litvinov^/ and
attempted to ascertain, without posing a direct ques-
tion, whether this event would lead us /i.e. the
Germans/ to change our attitude toward the Soviet
Union.^2/
On May 17, Astakhov again called on Schnurre and
repeatedly cited Italy as well as the view expressed
by Count Ciano that there were no obstacles to a
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normal development of political and economic rela-
tions between the two countries (Italy and the USSR),
even after creation of the Axis. Astakhov also men-
tioned the Treaty of Rapallo. In reply to one of
Schnurre's queries, the Russian characterized the
Anglo-Soviet negotiations begun in March with these
words: "On the basis of their current status, Eng-
land would not achieve its desired goal. "4/
Three days later, Count Werner Friedrich von der
Schulenburg (German Ambassador to the USSR) was re-
ceived by Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov. On the
topic of commercial talks, Molotov stated that the
Soviet Government could only agree to their resump-
tion "when the necessary political basis had been
created. "M He would not give any more definite in-
formation. The German Ambassador reported to Weiz-
saecker that the Russians apparently wanted to obtain
further proposals of a political nature.
It was not until 30 May that the Germans actually
decided to negotiate with the USSR. In a telegram
of that date Weizsaecker informed Schulenburg that,
contrary to hitherto planned tactics, 2/ Germany had
made the decision to resume definite contact with the
Soviet Union.
In describing his conversation with the Russian
Charge d f Affaires at Berlin, Weizaaecker reported in
this same telegram that he (Weizsaecker) agreed with
Molotov1s view; i.e., political and economic matters
could not be completely separated and that there was
a definite connection between the two.
Itold the /Russian/ Charge d f Affaires that
from our viewpoint economics and politics can-
not be completely separated in Russo-German
relations and emphasized that Iwas speaking
with him because of British attempts to draw
Russia into /the English/ camp and that we/Germany^ would be compelled to take into con-
sideration the political orientation of Mos-
cow.i/
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The Kremlin probably decided to investigate what
the Germans would offer them. This is a logical ex-
planation for the lengthy visit two weeks later which
the Soviet Charge d'Affaires paid t o the Bulgarian
Minister (Dragonov) in Berlin. The two men had not
been on an intimate footing before this occasion of
14 June.
Astakhov told the Bulgarian that the USSR was
vacillating among three possibilities: (1) a con-
clusion of a pact with the West, (2) further pro-
crastination in these talks, or (3) a rapprochement
with Germany. The Russian diplomat plainly stated
that the USSR really desired to achieve the last of
these three aims.
Ina Foreign Office memorandum Dr. Ernst Woermann,
Undersecretary of State and Head of the Political
Division, reports Dragonov as having told him that:
The Charge d'Affaires /Astakhov/ mentioned Mein
Kampf in this connection. If Germany were to
make a declaration that it would not attack the
Soviet Union or /that itwould/ conclude a non-
aggression pact with the latter, then the Soviet
Union would abstain from any agreement with
England. However, the Soviet Union does not
know what Germany really desires, apart from
certain very nebulous approaches. 2/
The implication here is quite easy to discern.
There was no reason for the call and for the ensuing
conversation other than to have Dragonov report the
whole matter to the German Foreign Office, which he
immediately did. A broad hint was thus provided by
the Kremlin to the effect that it was ready to talk
business with Berlin.
The Germans immediately took up the offer and ar-
ranged for a meeting between their Legation Counselor
in Moscow, Gustav Hilger,2/ and the Soviet Foreign
Trade Commissar, Anastas I.Mikoyan. This took place
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on 17 June, Hilger having just returned to his post
from Berlin. The German offer included the sending
of Herr Schnurre to Moscow with authority to negoti-
ate expansion and strengthening of economic rela-
tions.
Schulenburg characterized these talks and Mikoy-
an's tactics as follows:
Mikoyan does not wish to break off our talks,
but desires tomaintain the negotiations firmly
in hand, so as to control their procedure at
all times. It apparently does not fitinto the
current picture of the Soviet government's over-
all policy to resume commercial talks, especi-
ally when trips by a /German/ envoy plenipo-
tentiary to Moscow create a sensation.
In other words, the USSR manifested little con-
fidence in the good intentions of the Reich. It was
apparently believed by top Soviet policy makers that
Nazi moves were only Scheinmanoe ver, intended to in-
fluence London and Paris by an ostentatious resump-
tion of trade negotiations with Moscow at this time.
Russia possibly feared that after acquiring what po-
litical advantages it could from such a move, the
Reich would allow these commercial talks to collapse.
The Germans were also busy with their ovn efforts
to make certain that the West would, not enter into a
pact with Moscow. In the words of a Rumanian diplo-
mat ". . .the real apostle of reconciliation between
German National Socialism and Russian National Bol-
shevism was /Nazi Foreign Minister, Joachim/ von Rib-bentrop. . ."ii/ During the third week of July, Rib-
bentrop sent his best economic negotiator, Dr. Wohl-
tat to London allegedly for conferences with Robert
Hudson, Secretary of the Department for Overseas
Trade, on matters of secondary importance.
Wohltat also met a number of times withSir Horace
Wilson, Prime Minister Chamberlain's trusted confi-
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dant. The news leaked out that the two men were con-
ferring on a general settlement. Britain was re-
portedly ready to provide Germany witha loan of one
billion pounds sterling. In return, Hitler was to
limit his rearmaments, restore Czechoslovakia, and
so on. When questioned in the House of Commons,
Neville Chamberlain admitted that conferences had
taken place, but that his subordinates had acted on
their own initiative. Soviet suspicions were aroused,
however, just as Ribbentrop presumably had planned.
On 22 July, the Soviet press carried a report to
the effect that Soviet-German negotiations on com-
merce and credit had been opened in Berlin and that
they were being conducted between "Comrade" Babarin,
Deputy Commercial Representative and Chief of the
USSR Trade Mission, and Herr Schnurre. i£/
Four days later, the German representative invi-
ted Babarin and the USSR Charge d 1Affaires Astakhov
to dinner. During the conversation, Schnurre took
great pains to convince his two guests that there
was no threat menacing the USSR on the part of Ger-
many. He even cited Molotov a s having declared in
his 31 May speech that the Anti-Comintern Pact was
really a camouflage for an alliance aimed against the
Western democracies. i3/ In a memorandum Schnurre
quoted himself as having reasoned with the Russians
with these words:
The time is now appropriate but not for the
conclusion of a pact with London. One must
consider this in Moscow. What can England of-
fer Russia? In the best case participation in
an European war and the enmity of Germany, which
is hardly a goal t£ be striven toward by Rus-
sia. What can we /Germans/ offer, on the other
hand? Neutrality and remaining outside of a
possible European conflict and, if Moscow de-
sires, a German-Russian understanding on mutual
interests which, just as in earlier times, can
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be worked out for the benefit of both coun-
tries.Ik/
Schnurre further indicated that he thought Moscow
had not made up its mind as to which side it would
lean toward. He considered this condition to be an
explanation for Russia's receptive attitude, the de-
lay in economic negotiations, as well as the reten-
tion of USSR Ambassador Alexei Merekalov in Moscow,
Another reason probably involved the excessive dis-^
trust which the Russians harbored toward Germany. =¦£/
Allinall, Schnurre concluded that the Nazis should
consider the stalemate in Anglo-Soviet talks as a
great success for themselves.
The Germans, in the meantime, had been executing
their plans with great care. Ribbentr op saw Astakhov
on 2 August and gave him tounderstand that the Reich
was favorably disposed toward Russia. He made it
plain that ifMoscow took a positive attitude, there
would be no problem between the Black Sea and the
Baltic which could not be settled by the two coun-
tries to their mutual satisfaction.
The German Foreign Minister's words included a
reference to Poland: "If there is provocation on the
Polish side, we will settle our score within one
week's time. In such circumstance, Imade a slight
hint that we would want an understanding with Russia
on Poland's fate. "12/ He further told Astakhov that
if the Kremlin were interested, Molotov could con-
tinue the talks with Schulenburg in Moscow.
On 4 August, The German Ambassador to Moscow called
on the Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar. He repeated
all of the arguments used previously by Ribbentrop
vis A vis Astakhov in Berlin. Molotov stated that
the USSR 's policy was defensive and aimed at creating
a protective front against aggression. He accused
Germany of supporting and promoting the war-like at-
titude of the Japanese through the Anti-Comintern
Pact.
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As a result of this conference, lasting one and
a quarter hours, Schulenburg was convinced that the
Soviet Union would sign with England and France*
"providing that they agree to allSoviet demands. "±37
However, he did think that his statements had made
some impression upon Molotov, but that itwould take
a considerable effort to swing the USSR over to the
German side.
Ten days later, a telegram from Schnurre to Schul-
enburg outlined Molotov's latest instructions to
Astakhov: the Soviets were interested in discussing
the problems of the press, cultural relations, Poland,
and former political agreements, in addition to eco-
nomic matters. This was exactly what Ribbentrop had
been awaiting. He despatched a long telegram to Schu-
lenburg on the same day, instructing the latter to
contact Molotov and indicate Hitler's readiness to
send his foreign minister to Moscow inperson for the
purpose of setting forth the Fuehrer's views to Stalin,
During the interview with Schulenburg, Molotov
brought up a report from the Soviet Charge d' Affaires
in Rome concerning a conference held withCount Ciano
at the end of June. The Italian Foreign Minister had
informed the Russian during this meeting that there
was in existence a plan for the improvement of Ger-
man-Soviet relations. It consisted of the following
three points :!§/
(l) Germany would not refuse to influence Ja-
pan concerning an improvement of its rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and a cessa-
tion of border conflicts.
(2) Furthermore, the possibility was raised
of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet
Union and a mutual guarantee of the Bal-
tic States; and
(3) Germany was prepared for a commercial a-
greement on a broad basis with the Soviet
Union.
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Schulenburg explained that this information had
originally emanated from a report by August Rosso,
Italian Ambassador to the USSR, and that itwas based
primarily on the man's own deductions. They were,
however, partly correct. Molotov replied that it
was not of the greatest importance whether Rosso 's
report had actually allbeen true; the USSR had gained
the impression from the negotiations held with Ger-
many that the latter country really had an earnest
intention of bringing about a change in mutual rela-
tions.
Several concrete questions were brought up, which
Moscow wanted elucidated. A significant one pertained
to the idea of entering into a non-aggression pact.
Was the German Government 's attitude positive in this
connection, or had the problem not been studied more
closely? Molotov said that the USSR wanted to know
whether the Reich was prepared to sign a non-aggres-
sion pact! This was an important question and had
to be answered before Ribbentrop's proposed trip to
Moscow.
The Nazi Foreign Minister telegraphed Moscow in
reply the very same day he had received the above-
mentioned dispatch. Hitler wanted Stalin to know
that he was ready (bereit) to conclude an irrevocable
non-aggression pact with the USSR for 25 years, tojointly guarantee the Baltic States, to influence
Russo-Japanese relations in the direction of an im-
provement. =^/
Schulenburg was told to stress the need for speed,
since Germany would not endure Polish "provocation"
indefinitely and thus a clash could come at any mo-
ment. Hitler was giving Ribbentrop plenipotentiary
authority to negotiate all Russo-German problems and
to sign the appropriate treaties. The latter could
leave Berlin for Moscow at any time after 18 August.
When the German Ambassador saw Molotov and read
him the new communication, the Russian transmitted
to him the USSR's answer to the note of 15 August.
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After the usual protestations of Soviet good will,
peaceful intentions, and a corresponding criticism
of Nazi foreign policy regarding Russia, the message
contained a repetition of the previously enunciated
Soviet principle that different political systems can
peacefully exist side by side.
Finally, Molotov came to the heart of the matter
and set down the following practical approach:^/
(l) First a commercial agreement must be con-
cluded. What has been commenced, must
also be brought to completion.
(2) Then after a brief period of time, the
Germans can choose between a non-aggres-
sion g_act or a reaffirmation of the
pallo/ neutrality treaty of 192 6. In
either case, a protocol must be attached.
Itmust include, i.al., the German dec-
laration of August 15th.
(3) As far as the planned trip of the German
foreign minister to Moscow is concerned,
the Soviet government prizes this sugges-
tion very highly. The proposed dispatch
of such a prominent statesman emphasizes
the genuineness of the German government 's
intentions. These stand in marked con-
trast to England, who in the person of
Strang had sent a second-rate official to
Moscow. A journey by the Reich's foreign
minister, however, would necessitate thor-
ough preparation.
On 18 August, Berlin ordered its Ambassador to
see Molotov and to emphasize Hitler's opinion that
quick results were indispensable since German-Polish
relations were becoming more acute by the day. The
first stage, in the development suggested by Moscow
was completed at Berlin in the form of a Russo-German
trade agreement (actually signed on 19 August). It
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was, therefore, time to take up the second point. The
German view was that "the non-aggression pact should
be simple and contain these three /sic/ parts :"^±/
(1) Germany and the USSR willunder no circum-
stance engage in war or in any other ap-
plication of force against each other.
(2) This pact will come into force immedi-
ately with the signatures and is valid
irrevocably for a period of 25 years.
Schulenburg was told to oppose appropriately any
new Russian objections. He was to emphasize that
Ribbentrop would be in a position to sign a special
protocol, including spheres of influence or other
foreign policy matters, and that only a personal meet-
ing could make such a settlement possible. The Ger-
man Ambassador was to state plainly the need for an
immediate visit by Ribbentrop to Moscow, in view of
the probable outbreak of war with Poland.^2/
On 19 August, none of Schulenburg 's arguments for
speed seemed to have any effect on Molotov. The Sov-
iets demanded first things first; i.e., the signing
and proclamation of the economic agreement. Next,
they wanted a specific statement of the points to be
covered by the protocol. The German draft of the
non-aggression treaty was not exhaustive at all in
Soviet eyes. Itdefinitely bore the imprint of haste
and improvisation.^/
Only thirty minutes after he had left the Kremlin,
Schulenburg received word to call on Molotov again
that same afternoon. He was told that it would be
acceptable to the USSR for Ribbentrop to arrive in
Moscow on 26 or 27 August, providing the economic
agreements are proclaimed the following day (i.e.,
on 20 August).
The text of a Soviet draft non-aggression treaty
was also handed to the German for transmittal to his
government. It was by far more elaborate than that
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of the Reich , containing a preamble and five arti-
cles as well as a postscript concerning the special
protocol. 24/ With the exception of the last refer-
ence, the draft followed the model of that series of
pacts which the USSR had concluded in the 'thirties
with Poland, Latvia, Estonia and other border states.
Instead of being satisfied with the Russian pro-
posal, Berlin began to press Moscow to move up its
Schedule. Hitler sent a personal telegram to Stalin
on 20 August as an ultimate recourse. He expressed
his satisfaction with the commercial agreement and
openly stated that, in his opinion, a non-aggression
pact with the USSR would mean the establishment of a
long-range policy. The Fuehrer accepted the Soviet
draft treaty and indicated that the supplementary
protocol could onlybe settled by a personal appear-
ance inMoscow of a responsible German statesman. 25/
The crisis with Poland was again mentioned as the
reason for speed. Then, Hitler suggested that Rib-
bentrop be received in Moscow on 22 or at the latest
23 August.
The Germans were aware of Britain's probable at-
titude in the event ofa Nazi-Polish conflict as far
back as April (see Chamberlain's comments in Parli-
ament on the Angle-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assis-
tance^/) . Confirmation of British support for Po-
land arrived as late as the middle of August in a
secret dispatch from the German Ambassador to the
Court of St. James:
Should Germany from any military consideration
-
ex. gr. in order to forestall an attack be-
lieved to be planned by Poland - feel herself
forced to take military action against Poland,
the fact would have to be reckoned with that
Britain would come to Poland's aid. Nor is it
likely that Britain would remain neutral ifin
such a war with Germany Poland were very soon
defeated. Here, too, Britain would make her
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decision, not from consideration of safeguard-
ing her world position. £±/
This was probably the reason, therefore, behind
the German drive for a pact with the USSR, a pact
that would break the threatening encirclement . Schu-
lenburg received Molotov's reply from Stalin only two
hours after Hitler's telegram had been delivered.
This was in the form of a personal message from Sta-
lin to Hitler, agreeing to Ribbentrop's arrival on
23 August. Molotov added orally that the Soviet gov-
ernment desired the publication of a brief communique
on the following day concerning the contemplated pact
and the arrival of the Reich 's Foreign Minister.
Ribbontrop was in Moscow on the appointed date,
having flown from Berlin. He reported directly to
Hitler that the Soviets demanded German recognition
of two Baltic Sea ports (Libau and Windau) as being
within the Russian sphere of influence and requested
the Fuehrer^ immediate consent. Three hours later,
the acquiescence was transmitted to Moscow by tele-phone.^/
The Nazi Foreign Minister described the conversa-
tions he had held with Stalin and Molotov during the
night of 23/24 August ina long memorandum. The dis-
cussions covered Italy, Japan, Turkey, England, France,
the Anti-Comintern Pact, the attitude of the German
people toward a possible Russo-German non-aggression
pact. £2/ The treaty as well as the secret additional
protocol were both signed at this session in The
Kremlin.
A week later, Molotov submitted the Nazi-Soviet
Non- Aggression Pact to the USSR Supreme Soviet (leg-
islature) for ratification in the course ofa speech
during the 31 August meeting of the fourth special
session. He reviewed the Anglo-French negotiations
which had lasted four months in Moscow and claimed
that the West had. ignored the prime requisite for
such negotiations: "reciprocity and equality of ob-
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ligations."20/ Then turning to the pact with Germany
the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs stated that
ithad been signed in accordance with Stalin's for-
eign policy theses as presented to the XVIIICommu-
nist Party Congress only a few months before:
(l) To continue the policy of peace and of
strengthening business relations withall
countries;
(2) To be cautious and not to allow our coun-
try to be drawn into conflicts by war-
mongers who are accustomed to have others
pull the chestnuts out of the fire for
them.
The main importance of the agreement with Germany
was characterized by Molotovas the fact that the two
largest states in Europe "have agreed to put an end
to the enmity between them, to eliminate the menace
of war and to live at peace with one another. . . Even
ifmilitary conflicts inEurope should prove unavoid-
able, the scope of hostilities willnow be restric-
ted. . ."2-L/ The joint session of the Union Soviet
and the Soviet of Nationalities (both of which bodies
make up the USSR Supreme Soviet) unanimously adopted
a resolution approving the government
'
s foreign pol-
icy and ratifying the pact with Nazi Germany.
Unlike other non-aggression treaties, which the
USSR had signed in the past, this one (according to
Article 7) came into force "immediately upon signa-
ture. "^32/ Comparing the German and Soviet drafts,
it can be observed that the foregoing stipulation
represented point number two inthe former. The Rus-
sian draft, on the other hand, contained in Article
5 the statement that the pact was to come into force
upon ratification which is the usual procedure in
treaty relations. Hitler had a reason for demanding
immediate enforcement of the pact.
Another unusual characteristic of the Nazi-Soviet
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treaty was the absence of any clause whereby either
of the signatory powers could denounce it, if the
other party were to commit an act of aggression a-
gainsta third power. Previous treaties of this type,
entered into by the USSR, had included such an "es-
cape" clause. It was quite obvious that the Russians
were aware of the imminent attack against Poland.
Article IIIof the pact stated: "The governments
of both signatory parties willremain incontact with
each other in the future for consultation, in order
to inform themselves mutually on problems which touch
upon their common interests." These consultations
were to prove important inthe very near future, when
further negotiations and agreements took place.
The secret additional protocol to the Russo-German
pact of 1939 was not made public until 1948; i.e.,
three years after the United States Army had captured
the archives of the German Foreign Office. The top
secret negotiations, which resulted in this protocol,
were concerned with spheres of influence in Eastern
Europe. Definite agreement was reached on the fol-
lowing points :3^/
(1) The line of demarcation in the Baltic
States was to run along the northern bound-
ary of Lithuania. /This gave the USSR a
free hand to launch its attack on Finland
toward the end of 1939 and to occupy the
three Baltic States (including also Lith-
uania inviolation of the secret protocol)
in 1940^7(2) In Poland the boundary was to run along
the Narew, Vistula and San Rivers. Both
states were later to agree whether a "rump"
Poland was to be created or not.
(3) In South-Eastern Europe, the Russian in-
terest and German "disinterest" in Bes-
sarabia were acknowledged.
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(4) The protocol was to be kept in strict se-
crecy.
From this brief resume concerning the way in which
the Nazis conducted their negotiations, itis clear
that Hitler was pressed for time. The Soviets pre-
sumably knew this,15/ but themselves were faced with
a dilemma. They were certainly afraid of Germany
because of the many speeches and other pronouncements
on the Drang nach Qsten theme . They did not trust
England, since the British had given at least one in-
dication of a desire to channel Nazi aggressive aims
eastward.
The official Soviet diplomatic history book for
this period states that by signing the pact Germany
. . .demonstrated to the whole world its rec-
ognition of USSR might and the fear of possi-
ble participation by the Soviet state in a
struggle against Germany on the side of the
Anglo-French bloc. It is self -understood that
the agreement with Germany never constituted
proof of confidence by the Soviet government
in fascist Germany.^2/
Itmust be remembered that the leit-motif ofpower
politics has always been expediency. The Kremlin was
acting inits own best interests, and that has always
been its most important consideration in foreign af-
fairs.
Soon after the German invasion of the USSR, an
explanation of why the pact was signed came from Sta-
lin himself when he spoke over Radio Moscow on 3 July
1941 to the nationalities of the Soviet Union. He
stated that a pact of non-aggression is essentially
an agreement for peace and that the Russian govern-
ment could not have refused a German proposal for a
pact. Then, Stalin asked the rhetorical question:
"What did we win by signing the pact?" He concluded
that
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. . .We secured our country peace for a year
and a half, and the opportunity of preparing
its forces to repulse fascist Germany should
she risk an attack on our country despite the
pact . This "was a definite advantage for us and
a disadvantage for fascist Germany. 37/
Perhaps this was one of the motivations, although the
Russians were certainly not prepared for the German
onslaught when it came.
FOOTNOTES
1/ Department of State, Das Nationalsozialistische
Deutschland und die Sow.jetunion (Wash., D.C.:
GPO, 1948), St. S. No. 339, p. 2. Henceforth
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